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Abstract- The throughput maximization problem of wireless
mesh access networks is addressed. For the case ot cooperative
access points, we present a negotiation-based throughput maxi-
mization algorithm which adjusts the operating frequency and
power level among access points autonomously, trom a game-
theoretical perspective. We show that this algorithm converges
to the optimal frequency and power assignment which yields the
maximum overall throughput with arbitrarily high probability.
Moreover, we analyze the scenario where access points belong to
different regulation entities and hence non-cooperative. The long-
term behavior and corresponding pertormance are investigated
and the analytical results are verified by simulations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Metropolitan wireless mesh networks gain enormous popu-
larity recently [1]. The deployment of wireless mesh networks
not only facilitates the data communication by removing
cumbrous wires and cables, but also provides a means of
Internet access scheme, which is a further step towards the
goal of "communicating anywhere anytime". No matter where
the location is or the purpose that the wireless mesh access
network is deployed, the same conceptual layered architecture
is utilized. Figuic I illustrates dic liiciaicliical stiuctuic of
wireless mesh access networks. The peripheral nodes are the
access points (AP) which provide wireless access for the end
users, or clients. Each AP is attached' to a mesh router, which
is capable of communicating with any other mesh routers.
The center node is a gateway mesh router which functions
as an information exchange between the wireless mesh access
network and other networks such as Internet. Both the routing
algorithmic design and channel assignment for backbone mesh
routers are interesting issues and attract tremendous attention
from the commuiiny [5] [10].
In this paper, we investigate another important issue which
needs to be solved in wireless mesh access networks. As in
Figure 1, the AP and its associated clients form a regular
WLAN cell, which operates with the de facto IEEE 802.11
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Fig. I Hierarchical structure ot wireless mesh access networks
standards. The throughput of one cell depends on the signal-
to-interference plus-noise ratio (SINR) experienced at the re-
ceiver where the interference mainly comes from the other
operating cells. For example, if each of the cell operates with
IEEE 802 11 b standard, we can utilize a different frequency
band such as IEEE 802I11a or WiMAX [II], for the inter-
cell communication among mesh routers and hence causes
no interference to intra-cell transmissions. However, the co-
channel interference from other operating cells is inevitable
due to the liiiitation of available tiansiiission channels, e.g.,
3 non-overlapping channels in our example. Most current
off-the-shelf APs are capable of adjusting the transmission
rate according to the measured channel condition which is
indicated by transmission bit error rate (BER). Given a par-
ticular modulation scheme, BER is uniquely determined by
the SINR experienced by the receiver of the link. Generally
speaking, higher SINR value yields lower BER and higher
data rate. Therefore, the mutual interference dramatically
degrades the transmission rate of each cell and the aggregated
throughput of the whole network [12]. Each AP attempts
to tune the physical parameters such as operating frequency
and transmission power in order to maximize the SINR and
hence the throughput. In our work, we investigate the issue
of maximizing the overall throughput of the network, defined
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optimal frequency and transmission power allocation strategy.
Also, due to the concern of scalability and computational com-
plexity, we prefer a decentralized solution to the throughput
maximization problem.
Unfortunately, the throughput maximization problem is
challenging. For example, if the APs belong to different
regulation entities, the non-cooperative APs may only want
to maximize their own cell's throughput rather than the over-
all one. As shown in the literature, e.g. [13] ,the selfish
beha'viors o~f independent decision makers usually jeo~pardise
the overall performance from the social-welfare point of view.
The performance gap is named the price of anarchy and is
discussed in different contexts [f14]. Another difficulty which
makes the throughput maximization problem more challenging
is the interdependency among all APs. The frequency and
power selected by one AP affects the SINR of other APs, and
vice versa. Therefore, the throughput maximization problem
becomes coupled and finding the optimum solution is not
straightforward.
In this paper, we analyze the throughput maximization
problem for both cooperative and non-cooperative scenarios.
In the cooperative case, we model the interaction among all
APs as an identical interest gamc and present a decentralized
negotiation-based throughput maximizing algorithm for the
joint frequency and power assignment. We show that this
algorithm converges to the optimal frequency and power
assignment strategy, which maximizes the overall throughput
of the wireless mesh access network, with arbitrarily bigh
probability. In the cases of non-cooperative APs, we prove
the existence of Nash equilibria and show that the overall
throughput performance is usually inferior to the cooperative
cases. To bridge the performance gap, we propose a linear
pricing scheme to combat with the selfish behaviors of non-
cooperative APs.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II outlines the system model we considered in the paper.
The cooperative wireless mesh access networks and the non-
cooperative counterpart are investigated in Section III and Sec-
tion IV, respectively. The performance evaluation is discussed
in Section V and Section VI concludes this paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this paper, we consider a wireless mesh access network
illustrated in Figure 1. Each AP and corresponding clients
form a cell. Without loss of generality, we assume that all the
cells operate wsith IEEE 8029. 1 b standard and the interference
exclusively comes from the cells with same frequency. Fur-
thermore, the distance between cells are sufficiently large in
the sense that the accumulated interference experienced at the
receiver only affects the SINR value and not block the whole
transmission. We consider the worst case where all APs are
transmitting under saturated traffic load. In other words, the
APs always have packets to transmit and can communicate
with each other via the backbone mesh routers with negligible
delay. Also, we assume that the APs are transmitters and
clients are receivers due to the dominance of downlink traffic,
as assumed2in [16] [17] [18] [19] and [20]. We only focus on
the joint frequency and power allocation where the contention
behavior is less relevant and thus omitted. Therefore, we can
simplify our model as that all the APs are transmitting data
to the associated clients consistently. We assume that each AP
is capable of adjusting the operating frequency and power as
well as acquiring the SINR values measured at the client by
short ACK messages.
Let us first consider the simplest case where there is only
onue cell in the 'wireless mesh access netwo rrk, i.e., a single
WLAN. Upon receiving the SINR value3 measured by the
client, denoted by '-y, the AP tunes the physical parameters in
order to maximize the throaghpat, which is defined as
R*(-y) =maxRi (1 P,(-y,Rj)) (1)
where R1 is the raw data rate specified by the IEEE 802.II
standard and R*, i.e., the throughput of this cell, is a non-
decreasing function of received SINR .P, is the error
probability of the transmission channel, which is a function of
SINR value providing the transmission rate [21]. Apparently,
if there is only one cell in the mesh access network, the AP
will boost the power as much as possible to increase the value
of 7i and thus the throughput is maximized.
We now consider the cases where N cells coexist in the
wiireless mesh access net"work. Let pi and f, denote the
power and frequency for the ith AP, respectively. We use
i= lPi P2~
.. AP and f =[fl f2 Jy -, N to represent the
power and frequency assignment vector for all N APs. There-
fore, for each cell i, the value of SINR, i.e. -y, is a function
of (p. fl. The throughput of one cell depends not only on the
power level and frequency of itself, but also those of other
APs in the network. Therefore, the throughput maximization
problem is coupled and by no means straightforward.
In the following sections, we will discuss the scenarios
where the APs are cooperative and non-cooperative, respec-
tively. The performance evaluation of the two scenarios are
provided by simulations in Section V.
III. COOPERATIVE AcCESs NETWORKS
In this section, we consider the scenarios where all APs
in the wireless mesh access network are cooperative. The
transmission power of APs are quantized into discrete power
levels for simplicity. From the system point of view, we want
to find ajoint frequency and power level assignment such that
the overall throughput in the whole network is maximized.
Our objective function can be written as
Un twvork(P f)= ER*(-yr)
iil
N
ii
(2)
where RP is defined in (I).
2The dominance ot the downlink tratfic is verified by the experimental
measurements in r15] as well.
3Although there is no interference in this case, we adopt SINR instead ot
SNR for notation consistency.
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ment which maximizes (2) is non trivial. The interdependency
makes the problem coupled and difficult to solve by traditional
optimization methods [22]. A combination of (p, f) is named
aprofile and a naive approach to solve the problem is to inves-
tigate all profiles exhaustively. However, this is impossible in
practice. For example, in a medium-size wireless mesh access
network with 20 APs where each has 3 frequency channels
and 10 power levels, the search space is (3 x 10)20 profiles!
Obviously, the centralized algorithms are not favorable in the
wireless mesh access network due to the scalability concern
Moreover, the traditional site-planning methods are not feasi-
ble either. For example, the network administrator may want
to add more APs when more users are joining the network or
disable some APs where the associated users fail to pay the
bill. The network topology is not static, although the change
takes place slowly. Therefore, the demand for adaptability and
light computation burden requires a decentralized solution for
the throughput maximization problem. Next, we will introduce
a decentralized negotiation-based throughput maximization
algorithm, from a game-theoretical perspective.
A. Cooperative Throughput Maximization Game
The APs in the wireless mesh access networks are consid-
ered as players, i.e., decision makers of the game. We model
the interaction among APs as a Cooperative Throughput Max-
imization Game (CTMG), where each player has an identical
objective function Ui, as
N
Ui(p f) = Unetwork(P f) rR(p,f) Vi (3)
For each player i, all possible frequency and power level
pairs form a strategy space bi which has a size of c x 1, where
c is the number of frequency channels available and I is the
number of feasible power levels. Define
Q = (DI x (D2 X
... X (DN- (4)
Then, the N players autonomously negotiate about the joint
frequency-power profile in Q in order to find the optimal
profile which maximizes (3). However, due to the interde-
pendency among N players caused by mutual interference,
one question of interest is that whether this negotiation will
eventually meet an agreement, a.k.a., a Nash equilibrium. The
importance of Nash equilibria lies in that a possible steady
state of the system is guaranteed. If the game has no Nash
equilibrium, the negotiation process never stops and oscillates
in an everlasting fashion. In addition, we are concerning about
what the performance ofthe steady states would be, if exist, in
terms of overall throughput of the whole network. We provide
answers to these questions in the following.
Lemma 1: The CTMG is a potential game.
A potential game is defined as a game where there exists a
potentialfunction P such that
P(a',a_i)-P(a",a_i) = Ui(a',a_i)-Uia",a_i) Vi, a"
(5)
where Ui is the utility function for player i and a', a" are two
arbitrary strategies in b,. In our case, we have a' [p', ]
and a" =P, f[" The notation of a-i denotes the vector
of choices made by all players other than i. Potential games
have been broadly applied in modeling the interactions in
communication networks [23]. The popularity is on account
of the nice properties of potential games, such as
- Potential games have at least one Nash equilibrium.
- All Nash equilibria are the maximizers of the potential
function, either locally or globally.
- There are several learning schemes available which are
guaranteed to converge to a Nash equilibrium, such as
better response and best response [24] [25].
For detailed description about potential games, readers are
referred to [24] and [26], which investigates the potential game
theory in engineering context.
We observe that in the cooperative case, each player has the
same utility function as in (3), which is the overall throughput
of the network. Apparently, one potential function of the game
is the common utility function itself, i.e.,
P= Ul = U2 UN (6)
In fact, the games where all players share the same utility
function are called identical interest games [27], which is a
special case of potential games and hence all the properties of
potential games can be applied directly.
In the literature, both best response and better response
are popular learning mechanisms that have been utilized in
potential games [28]-[30]. At each step of the best response
approach, one of the players investigates its strategy space and
chooses the one with maximum utility value. This updating
procedure is carried out sequentially. The primary drawback
of the best response is the computational complexity which
grows linearly with the cardinality of the strategy space.
An improvement of the best response is the so-called better
response, where at each step, the player updates as long as the
randomly selected strategy yields a better performance. The
dramatically reduced computation is the tradeoff with the con-
vergence speed. Both the best response and the better response
dynamics are guaranteed to converge to a Nash equilibrium
in potential games [23]. However, there may be multiple
Nash equilibria in a potential game and the performance of
different equilibria may vary dramatically. Therefore, although
the best response and the better response could guarantee the
convergence, they may reach an undesirable Nash equilibrium
with inferior performance.
Let us consider an illustrative example in Figure 2. There
are four labeled APs in the network. A and B are close to
each other and so are C and D Without loss of generality
we assume that the APs have the same power and only adjust
the operating frequencies in an order of A B C' D
to avoid the interference. The adaptation continues with the
best response mechanism until a Nash equilibrium is reached
Suppose there are two frequency channels available, say 1 and
2. First A randomly selects one channel, say 1. B will pick 2.
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Fig. 2. An illustrative example ot multiple Nash equilibria.
Next, C has the chance to update. Since C is closer to B than
A, channel I will be selected. Finally, D will choose channel
2. By inspection, we claim that profile 1 2 -2 1 is a Nash
equilibrium since no player is willing to update its strategy
unilaterally. Meanwhile, we observe that another profile 1
2 1 2 is also a Nash equilibrium. Obviously, the second
Nash equilibrium generates much less interference than the
first Nash equilibrium and hence yields superior performance
in terms of overall throughput. However, the best response
only leads to the less desirahle Nash equilihrium.
In fact, the existence ofmultiple Nash equilibria is observed
in [28] by simulations. However, the authors fail to specify
which one would be the steady state of their game due to the
limitation of the best response, even in a statistical fashion.
Recall that the Nash equilibria are the maximizers of the
potential function in potential games, converging to an inferior
Nash equilibrium analogously indicates being trapped at a
local optimum of the potential function. However, it is the
global optimum, i.e., the optimal Nash equilibrium, that is the
desirable steady state which we are yearning for.
Next, we introduce a negotiation-based throughput max-
imization algorithm (NETMA) which can converge to the
optimal Nash equilibrium with arbitrarily high probability.
B. NETMA- NEgotiation-based Throughput Maximization Al-
gourithrm
We assume that the APs are homogeneous and each has
a unique ID for routing purpose. Each AP maintains two
valuables Dpre and D,,, The AP has the knowledge of its
current throughput and records it in D,ur, Whenever there is a
change of throughput caused by exterior interference , the AP
sets DPre Dcur and resets Dcur with the newly measured
throughput. When the wireless mesh access network enters
the negotiation phase5, NETMA is executed. The detailed
procedure of NETMA is provided as follows.
NETMA:
-Initialization: For each AP, a pair of frequency and
power level is randomly selected. Set DPr, Dce
4We assum-e the channel is slow-varying and the ehange ot throughput tor
a single cell is due to the mutual interterence only.
5The negotiation phase can be initiated by the network administrator atter
a new contraeted user joins or a current user terminates the service, or on a
daily basis.
equals the current throughput.
Repeat:
1) Randomly choose one of the AP, say k, as the up-
dating one, i.e., each AP updates with a probability
of 1IN.
2) For the updating AP k-
a) Randomly chooses a pair of frequency and
power level, say f' and p', from the strategy
space (Dk Then the AP computes the current
throughput with J' and p' and records it into
Dcur,
b) Broadcasts a short notifying message which con-
tains its unique IDk to all the other APs in the
mesh access network.
3) For each AP other than k, sayj
a) It the ½j value changes, records the previous
throughput into Dpre and the cufrent throughput
into Dcu, Remains unchanged otherwise.
b) Upon receiving the notifying message, a three-
value vector of [Dpre Dcur IDj is sent hack
to the k-th AP.
4) After receiving all the three-value vectors by count-
ing the identifiers ITDj, the k-th AP computes the
sum throughput before and after f and p' are
selected, which are denoted by Pp, and Pmur.
5) For a smoothing factor TF 0, the k-tb AP keeps
f'and p' with a probability of
cP,,1
CPcur/T+ CPpre.IT (7)
6) The km th AP broadcasts another short notifying mes-
sage, which indicates the end of updating process
and a specific number 6, to all the other APs.
Until: The stopping criteria F is met.
Note that in step 6, the specific format of 3 depends on the
predefined stopping criterion F. For example,
* If the stopping criterion is the maximum number of
negotiation steps, 3 is a counter which adds one after
each updating process.
* If the stopping criterion is that no AP has updated for a
certain number of steps, is a binary numbe.r where I
means updating.
* If the stopping criterion is that the difference between
sum throughput obtained in consecutive steps are less
than a predefined threshold E, 3 is the calculated sum
throughput after each updating process.
We can have other stopping criteria Fs and corresponding
formats of 3 as well.
The NETMA algorithm is inspired by the work in [31],
where a similar algorithm was first introduced in the context
of stream control in MIMO interference networks. The distin-
guishing feature of this type of negotiation algorithms, from
the better response and the best response, is the randomness
deliberately introduced on the decision making in step 5. The
rationale can be illustrated in FigTure 2 intuitively. If there is no
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get trapped at a low efficiency Nash equilibrium 1 2 -2 -1.
However, with the randomness caused by nonzero T, they may
reach an intermediate state 1 2 -2 -2 and arrive at the
optimum Nash equilibrium 1 2 1 2 eventually.
The steady state behavior of NEIMA~is characterized in
the following theorem.
Theorem 1. NETMA converges to the optimal Nash equi-
librium in CTMG with arbitrarily high probability.
Proof: The proof of Theorem I follows similar lines of
the proocf in L31] and [32]
line, we obtain
cil cil
EPr*(S11I)XPr(S1,kS1)
= Pr*(SI,k) XPr(SI
k=2 k=2
By substitiuting (9) with (R), w'e ha've
~cxiPP(Sl,)k£
Zk Pr*(5 1) x (l1/ P(S.)-
I5 Slk)
(9)
(10)
O)bserving the symmetry of equation (Il0) as well as the
Markovian cbain, we note that the set of equations as (10) are
all balanced if for arbitrary state $ in the strategy space Q,
the stationary distribution is
Pr*(5) =/e(e,~5/ (If1)
where IC is a constant. By applying the probability conserva-
tion law [34] [33], we obtain the stationary distribution for the
Markovian chain as
xY NY*
.. . i Pr*(5) =YSc2ep(si) (12)
for arbitrary state S~ Q.
In addition, we observe that the Markovian chain is irre-
ducible and aperiodic. Therefore, the stationary distribution
given in (1 2) is valid and uiniqiue.
Let S* be the optimal state which yields the maximum value
of potential function P, ice,
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
.i.y NY~X ..Y ..
Fig. 3. Markovian chain ot NETMA vwith tvwo players.
First, we observe that the joint frequency-power negotiation
generates an N-dimensional Markovian chain. Figure 3 illus-
trates the Markovian chain introduced by NETMA with two
players, say A and B. Let x and y be the choices for each
player , where x c 4A and y c4B. In other words, player A
can choose a frequency-power pair from [xi , x.,I] and
player B can choose from iyi,
- ,y,ci] Note that at an
arbitrary time instant, only one of the players can update. In
Figure 3, for example, state (i, Yi) can only transit to a state
either in the same row or the same column, not anywhere else.
This is true for every state in the Markovian chain. Let Sij
denote the state of (Xiz, Yi). We have
{
£ SIo ~~
2x ex I(eP(Sm )/-+
ifori i ,orrTI= j
0~
otherwise.
where T is the smoothing factor in step 5 of NETMA.
Let us derive the stationary distribution Pr* for each state.
We examine the balanced equations for the directions. Writing
the balance equations [33] at the place marked with dashed
(13) S =argmax 0,cQP(Si)
Fro~m (12), wec have
limPr*(S*) =I
T-+o (14)
which substantiates that NETMA converges to the optimal
state in probability.
Finally, the analogous analysis can be straightforwardly
extended to an N-dimensional Markovian chain and thus
completes the proof. U
In NETMA, there is no central computational unit required.
The Joint frequency-power assignment is achieved by nego-
tiations aimong coouperative APs and the mfaximumf overlal
throughput is achieved with arbitrarily high probability. The
autonomous behavior and decentralized implementation make
NETMA suitable for large scale wireless mesh access net-
works. Moreover, NETMA has fast adaptability for the topol-
ogy change oAf the w'ireless mesh access nctwo ~rks. NETMA
does not depend on any rate adaption algorithms, nor on any
underlying MAC protocols. In our simulation in Section V,
we use IEEE 802.1lb as the MAC layer protocol. However,
it can be easily extended to arbitrary MAC protocol with
multi-rate multi-channel capability, such as IEEE 8021lIa.
NETMA mechanism can also be applied in the cases where
non-overlapping channels are utilized [35]. In addition, even
with the existence of exterior interference source, such as
coexisting WLANs, NETMA works properly as well since the
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the network in the current wireless environments. The tradeoff
between algorithmic performance and convergence speed is
controlled by parameter Tin step 5, where large Trepresents
extensive space search with slow convergence. On the contrary,
small Trepresents limited space search with fast convergence.
Note that the smoothing factor TF here is analogous to the
concept of temperaturc in simulated annealing [36]. Therefore,
it is advisable that at the beginning period of the negotiation,
the value of T iS set with a large number and keeps deceasing
as the negoitiation iterates. We choosae T=11in our
simulations, where k denotes the negotiation step.
In step 1, we require that each AP updates with probability
1INV For example, each AP may randomly set a backoff
counter as in IEEE 802.11 DCF protocol. In the case of
collision, which means two APs update at the same time in our
case, it only prolongs the convergence time for NETMA and
does not affect the final output ofNETMA. This is because that
the conflict, as verified in [29] via extensive simulations, has
no influence on the statistically monotonic-increasing tendency
of the potential function. We believe that by applying carefully
designed backoff mechanisms as in IEEE 802.II standards, the
successive collisions are very rare and the convergence speed
of NETMA is subtly lessened.
IV. NON-COOPERATIVE AcCESs NETWORKS
In the previous section, we discuss the scenarios where all
APs in the wireless mesh access network are cooperative, and
the overall throughput is maximized by negotiations among
autonomous APs using the NETMA mechanism. However,
cooperation is not always attainable. Although the function-
ality of relaying packets for each other can be achieved by
incentive mechanisms such as [37], the adjustable parameters
inside each cell cannot be enforced and effectively controlled.
The N APs may belong to distinct self-interested users and
they care about exclusively their own throughput rather than
the overall aggregated throughput. In other words, the utility
function of each selfish user is
Ui R*Qyi) (15)
where R* is the throughput of the ith cell, defined in (I).
Analogous to CTMG, we can formulate the interaction among
N selfish APs as a Non-cooperative Throughput Maximnizing
Game (NTMG) where each AP is attempting to find the
frequency-power pair which maximizes its own SINR value as
well as the corresponding throughput. As in the cooperative
case, each player's utility function depends on the frequency
and power of itself as well as those of others. However, NTMG
is no longer an identical interest game.
Lemma 2:- In NTMG, all the APs will transmit with the
maximal power at the Nash equilibrium, if exists.
Proof: The proof of Lemma 2 is straightforward. For a
single player, we have
pigi
Yi=E(~F f- PkgJki V,N
where pij is the channel gain from cell i's transmitter to j's
receiver and V1 is the Gaussian noise at the i's receiver. T (fr)
denotes the set of cells which operate at the same frequency
f1 other than cell i.Note that given other players' strategies,
-iis a monotonic increasing function of pi and so is U,.
Assume at a Nash equilibriuma of NTMG, the k-th AP has
a power level Of Pk satisfying 0 <_Pk <~na, where Pmfax
denotes the maximum power defined by MAC layer. The k-th
AP is inclined to increase its power Pk in order to yield a
higher value of U1, which contradicts the definition of Nash
equilihrium. Thus, at the Nash equilihrium ofNTMGT ifexists,
all the APs will operate at the same power level, ice, Pine
U
Based on Lemma 2, the NTMG can be viewed as a sim-
plified game where each player has the same power and only
adjusts tic ficquciicy to miniiiiiiizc die iiiteifeiciic. Moicovci,
according to (15) (16) and the assumption of uniform envi-
ronment, the NTMG is equivalent to the following simplified
game where each player has the utility function6 as
(17) U1 = ( E Pmaxgki Ni)
k Y.j(fi)
and Ui is a function of frequency assignment vector f exclu-
sively.
As in the cooperative case, the frequency selection among
A players is mutually dependent. For example, we have two
frequency channels available, I and 2. At a time instance to,
channel 2 has fewer APs. Therefore, the APs in channel 1
are inclined to switch. However, this may make 2 much more
crowded and the APs want to switch back. The question arises
that whether this frequenicy adjusting dynamuic~cinverges, or
equivalently, whether NTMG has a Nash equilibrium. The
existence of Nash equilibrium is crucial for the analysis
of interactive dynamics since the lack of Nash equilibrium
indicates that the interaction will never converge. The whole
network will be overwhelmed by o~scillating adjustments and
will never reach a steady state. We provide the answer of the
question in the following theorem.
Theorem 2. There exists at least one Nash equilibrium in
NTMG.
Proof: Let us first consider the simplified game. For each
player, the utility function is given as
u r Pkgki +N1) (18)
k F(fi)
Z Pkggi1Xb(fi A) +NI) (19)
2 k
where
6(k) { 2; ifk=0
otherwise. (20)
(16) 6The aegative sign comes trom the convention that utility tunctions are the
ones to he maximized.
16
Authorized licensed use limited to: Univ of Calif Santa Barbara. Downloaded on November 13, 2008 at 16:14 from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply.We conjecture that one of the feasible potential functions is
2 X E Pkgki- (21)
iYENkEF(fi)
The verification is as follows.
2P L Z Pkgki
iV Nk (fp
{
{
Z% Pkgki +
kGF,(fi) j:
z z
k r
{pgijj6fi
kFfk Pk.IkjI}
{kL Pkgkic6(fk- fi6
kOi g6jfkfN
j j
z
iz'i,G krT-;(f;)kz
Pkgkj}
Note that
Pkgki6jfk -Af) p Pgik&(fi fk)
for any pair of i,k We have
where
2i + xQ(i)}
and Q(-i) is independent of f. Therefore, for arbitrary
frequencies a' and a" of player i, we have
Qa(-i
= a
and
FJ-,(a)Pk9ki+IX Qa(-i)}
kEEF,(all Pkgki + Qa'( t)}
Therefore, according to the definition in (5), the simp]
game is a potential game and has at least one Nash eqL
rium. Thus, the existence of Nash equilibrium in NIM
obtained from the equivalence derived from Lemma 2.
Lemma 2 shows that at the equilibrium, the non-cooper
APs will always transmit at the maximum power level.
seem to be the best choice for each one of the APs. However, it
is usually not a favorable strategy from a social-welfare point
of view. The price of anarchy is owing to the non-cooperative
nature. To bridge the performance gap, we propose a linear
pricing scheme to combat with the selfish behaviors, i.e., the
players are forced to pay a tax proportional to the utilized
resources. For example, we could impose a price to all selfish
APs for the power they utilize. Hence for each AP, the utility
function becomes
PkgIkj} UR(7 ) Ap,i (28)
where A' represents the power utilization price specific for
the ith AP and pi is its transmission power. Therefore, the
more power AP uses, the more tax it has to pay. By imposing
power prices properly, a more desirable equilibrium may
he induced, from a social-w~elfare point oif view. We define
the corresponding game as a Non-cooperative Throughput
Maximization Game with Pricing (NTMGP).
Let us first investigate the impact of prices on the behaviors
of players. If A'=0 where no price is imposed, the ith AP
will transmit at the the maximum power and causes extra in-
terference to other APs. However, if we impose an unbearably
high price, say APj =xo, the AP would rather not to transmit
at all. Based on these observations, we propose a heuristic
(22) linear pricing scheme to improve the overall throughput in
non-cooperative wireless mesh access networks.
To enforce the scheme, we introduce a pricing dictator
unit (PDU) into the network which determines the prices for
(23) all APs and informs them timely. In addition, we assume
that the PDU has the monitoring capability and is aware of
the operating frequencies of each cell. There are two prices
charged by the PDU for each non-cooperative AP. Besides
(2) the power utilizing price A', afrequency switching price A'
is imposed on the ith AP whenever it changes the operating
frequency. The price setting process is described as follows.
(25) Price setting process:
Phase I:
Itwo - The PDU sets Alf A7 0 and 4l A.
o and all APs play NTMG until converges, i.e., a
(26) ~~Nash equilibrium is reached.
-The PDU collects the current throughput information
from each cell, denoted by Aif, where iis the index
of the cell.
Phase II:
-The PDU sets Al AN Oxm.
-For each AP indexed by i = V,
1) The PDU sets A' oo for the i -th AP and let
(27) ~~the APs play the NTMGP. Upon convergence, the
lifted PDU collects the overall throughput, say Vi, in
iilibh the current price setting.
[G is 2) Calculate the power utilizing price for the i-th
- AP as
-ative
This
V, Z- 1V
Pmlow ll (29)
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output'.
-Power utilizing price vector AP IA>. PI
- Frequency switching price vector At =c ,X oCDI
In the price setting process above, the PDU imposes zero
prices for all APs initially. As a consequence, all APs will
transmit with pmaw,, at the equilibrium, as shown in Lemma
2. Upon convergence, the PDU fixes the frequency switching
price to infinity which discourages the non-cooperative APs
from switching channels thereafter. In (29), 4' -,NIj is
the sum throughput for all cells other than i, when thie ith AP
transmits with the maximal power due to the zero power price.
Similarly, Vi is the sum throughput of other cells when the ith
AP is silent due to the unaffordable power price. Therefore, in
(29), the power utilization price charged for the ith AP, a.k.a.
AP> can be viewed as a compensation to the impact it causes
on the overall throughput of other cells. The more power it
utilizes, the more severe it affects the other players and thus
the more it pays, as illustrated in (28). Hence, by imposing
taxes deliberately, the selfish behaviors ofnon-cooperative APs
are effectively discouraged and a more desirable equilibrium,
in term of overall throughput of the whole network, can be
induced. We will present the detailed performance evaluation
of CTMG, NTMG and NTMGP in the next section.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We consider a wireless mesh access network with N ho-
mogeneous APs. The simulation parameters are summarized
as follows.
* Each AP has a maximum power p,,,
= 100mW and a
minimum power p,j=r 10mrW and 10 different power
levels as [10mW, 20mW;..
- , 100mW,.
* The noise experienced at each receiver is assumed iden-
uical and has a power of 2mW,
* All APs use IEEE 8021 fIb standard as the MAC protocol.
In other words, each AP has four feasible data rate,
1 2, oo. 11 Mbps and 3 non-overlapping channels, i.e.,
. Without los of generality, we assume that the received
power is inversely proportional to the square of the
Euclidian distance.
* The smoothing factor T decreases as T= 101k2 where
k is the negotiation step.
. The stopping criteria foir NETMA and NTMGl are the
maximum number of iterations, denoted by wc.
For the sake of simplicity, we utilize a table-driven rate
adaption algorithm, where a data rate is selected if and only
if a certain SINR threshold is met. The mapping relationship
is shown in Table I, provided by [38]. Note that our results
can also be applied to arbitrary propagation models, rate
adaptation algorithms and underlying multi-channel multi-rate
MAC protocols.
TABLE I
DATA RATES V.S. SINR THRESHOLDS WITH MAXImum BER 10-5
Rate(Mbps) Minimum SINR (dB
1 -2.92
2 1.59
5.5 5.98
11 6.99
A. Example of Small Networks
WXe first consider a small wireless mesh access network
with 5 APs, i.e. NV 5. All APs are randomly located in
a square of 10-by-10 area. The global optimum solution is
obtained by enumerating all feasible strategies, i.e. (3 x10)5
profiles, as the performance benchmark. We first investigate
the cooperative scenario where NETMA mechanism is p
plied. Next, the non-cooperative scenario is considered and
each AP operates at the maximum power and adjusts the
frequency only. The stopping criteria for both NETMA and
NTMG are the maximum number of iterations where =200.
The performance comparison is shown in Figure 4.
N=5, c=3
2
32-
30
28-
26 26
E24-
C/)
22
20
18'
i
iii op
m-NETMA
- NTMG
2i 4i 6i 8i iii 12i
Iteration
140 160 18i 200
Fig. 4. Pertormance evaluation ot the wireless mesh access network with N
5andec 3.
As indicated by the OP curve, the global optimum obtained
by enumeration approach functions as the upper bound of
the overall throughput. In Figure 4, we observe that NETMA
gradually catches up with the global optimum as negotiations
go. As expected, the non-co'operative A~Ps yield remarkably in-
ferior performance in terms of overall throughput, depicted by
the NTMG curve. The inefficiency is due to the selfish behavior
that APs transmit at the maximum power and are regardless
of the interference. The existence of Nash equilibrium in both
CTMG and NTMG are substantiated by the convergence of
curves in Figure 4. Figure 5 and Figure 6 depict the trajectories
of frequency negotiations and power level negotiations in
NETMA, respectively. At the initialization, each AP randomly
picks a frequency and a power level and negotiates with each
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of frequency negotiations in Fig. 5. The trajectory
and c 3.
the performance inefficiency of NTMG caused by the non-
AP 1 cooperative APs which transmit at the maximum power. The
AP 2 ~~AP 3 average throughput per AP is calculated by averaging the
-1-A results of 50 simulations, for each value of the side length
d. In Figure 7, it is worth noting that as the side length d gets
bigger, the performance gap between NETMA~anid NTMG
reduces. The reason is that when the area is large, the impact
of mutual interference is less severe and so is the performance
deterioration. However, when the network is crowded, i.e., d
is small, the selfish behaviors are remarkably devastating.
To alleviate the throughput degradation by the non-
cooperative APs, we implement the linear pricing scheme
introduced in Section IV. The throughput improvement is
illustrated as NTMGP in Figure 7. It is noticeable that
_140 O 160 1~80 200by utilizing the proposed pricing scheme, the efficiency of
Nash equilibrium is dramatically enhanced, especially for
crowded networks. Therefore, the selfish incentives of the non-
NETMA when N -_5 cooperative APs have been effectively suppressed.
N = 5, c =3
100 I -...--0...... -...-P
10.5 F
-AP 1
I I ~~~AP
3
1 1 * ~~~~~AP
4
1 -~ ~~~~~~P
N = 20, c = 3
10
-0 9.5-
< 9
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CD- 8.5-
0)
0)
6.5 _w
6--
5.5'
100
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
Iteration
110 120 130 140 150 160
Side Length
--NETMA
NTMGP-
.....NTMG
170 180 190 200
Fig. 6. The trajectory of power negotiations in NETMA when N 5 and c
3.
other foAlloing NEIMA/ mechanism, until the optimum Nash
equilibrium is achieved. Note that when the frequency vector
and power vector converge in Figure 5 and Figure 6, the
corresponding overall throughput obtained by NETMA catches
the global optimum in Figure 4 simultaneously.
B. Example of Large Networks
We now consider a large wireless mesh access network with
20 APs. The enumeration approach is no longer feasible in
this scenario due to the enormous strategy space. The 20 APs
are randomly scattered in a d-by-d square, where the side
length d is a tunable parameter in simulations. We investigate
both cooperative and non-cooperative cases represented by
NETMA and NTMG curves, where the maximum number of
iterations is set to = 1000. Figure 7 pictorially depicts
Fig. 7. Performance evaluation of the vwireless mesh access netvwork with N
20Oand c _3.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we investigate the throughput maximization
problem in wireless mesh access networks. The problem is
coupled due to the mutual interference and hence challenging.
We first consider a cooperative case where all APs collaborate
w ith each other in o~rder to maximize the ovxerall throughput
of the network. A negotiation-based throughput maximiza-
tion algorithm, a.k.a., NETMA, is introduced. We prove that
NETMA converges to the optimum solution with arbitrarily
high probability. For the non-cooperative scenarios, we show
the existence and the inefficiency of Nash equilibria due to the
selfish behaviors. To bridge the performance gap, we propose
a linear pricing scheme which tremendously improves the
performance in terms of overall throughput. The analytical
results are verified by simulations.
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network with orthogonal channels. Our future work will extend
to non-saturated networks with partially overlapping channels.
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